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1. INTRODUCTION

International human rights law has only very recently begun to address
issues of sexual identity. When international human rights law was being
developed after World War II, in the shadow of the horrors of the Nazi regime,
same-sex sexual activity was illegal in most nations.' The status of gay men
and lesbians as criminals and/or as mentally ill 2 no doubt meant that rights
associated with sexual identity were not even imagined as part of the corpus of
international human rights law. This was the case despite the fact that lesbians
and gay men were explicitly targeted by the Nazi regime in Germany and
interned in concentration camps. Reform of the criminal law began in Britain
in 1967, 3 and the reform process has spread to most western countries. But
many nations, including seventeen United States states, still criminalize same-

LL.B (Hons) BSc LL.M (University of Melbourne), LLM (Columbia). Senior Lecturer in Law,
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1.
In some countries, only male-male sexual activity was specifically criminalized; however, this
did not mean that lesbians were not subjected to the criminal law. Lesbians were often arrested and
prosecuted under more general laws dealing with sexual behavior.
2.
Up until the 1970s, "homosexuality" was regarded as a mental illness in the United States, and
it is still considered a mental illness in some nations today.

3.
See NICHOLAS BAMFORTH, SEXUALITY, MORALS AND JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LESBIAN AND
GAY RIGHTS LAW 28-32 (1997).
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sex sexual activity. And gay and lesbian identity remains stigmatized in most
countries, even those where decriminalization has occurred.
Notwithstanding the continued stigmatization and criminalization of samesex sexual activity, in the last decade we have seen the emergence of gay,
lesbian, and transsexual rights issues on the international stage. In Part (I), of
this paper, I will provide a brief overview of the development of international
human rights law in the area of sexual identity. In Part (II), I will look at
refugee law as a case study that offers us some insight into the way in which
this development has occurred. In particular, this section will highlight the way
in which international human rights law has focussed very much on sexual
identity, rather than on non-normative sexual behaviors. In Part (I), I will
offer some thoughts on the direction international human rights law might take
from here. I will suggest that it is desirable to move away from the identity
model as the sole focus and towards a model that seeks to deal more generally
with sexuality. One way in which this could be achieved is through the
articulation of a right to sexual self-determination.
II. SEXUAL IDENTITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW
A.

Europe

The development of international human rights law in the area of gay and
lesbian sexuality began in the 1980s, in Europe, when the European Court of
Human Rights held in two landmark cases that criminalization of consensual
adult sex between men in private violated the right to privacy protected by the
European Convention on Human Rights.4 Over the subsequent years, the
European Court of Human Rights has developed a reasonably extensive
jurisprudence on sexual identity and human rights, not all of it positive. Gay
men and lesbians have been quite successful in invoking the right to privacy
under the European Convention in cases ranging from the discriminatory age
of consent in Britain5 to the ban on lesbians and gay men serving in the armed
forces in Britain.6 Not all the privacy cases have succeeded, however. A
challenge to the criminalization of consensual sado-masochistic (S-M) sexual
practices in Britain by three gay men failed. 7
4.
Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)(1988); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser A)(1981).
5.
Euan Sutherland v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 25186/94, Eur. Comm'n H.R. (1997) (visited
Feb. 18, 2000). <http://www.dhcommhr.coe.fr/eng/25186R3 l.E.html>.
6.
Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom, App. No. 00031417/96; 00032377/96, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (1999); Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, 1999 WL 478154 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Sept. 1999).
7.
Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. United Kingdom, 1997 WL 1104639 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Feb. 1997).
Although the criminal law in question (the common law of assault) did not, at least on its face, discriminate
on the basis of sexual preference, the British courts seemed to be influenced by this fact: the judgment in the
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In contrast to the general success of privacy arguments, lesbians and gay
men have been less successful in the areas of equality and respect for family life
under European law. Discriminatory provision of employment benefits to
heterosexual couples has been upheld by the European Court of Justice,' and,
to date, no gay or lesbian family arrangement has been protected under Article
8 of the European Convention, which provides for respect for family life, as gay
and lesbian relationships, even those involving children, are not recognized as
"family" under the Convention. 9 However, there are some indications that this
situation may change. The European Court of Human Rights ruled, as I was
writing this paper, that the non-discrimination clause of the European
Convention, Article 14, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. 0 In the case in question, the applicant had been denied custody of
his child because he was gay. He claimed interference with his private and
family life under Article 8 and Article 14 of the Convention, and the Court
upheld his claim. The fact that the extension of Article 14 to sexual orientation
came in a case concerning family issues suggests that protection for lesbian and
gay families may eventually emerge in the European system.
In contrast to the record of lesbians and gay men, transsexuals have been
on the whole successful in Europe in invoking the right to equality," but
13
2
unsuccessful in invoking the right to privacy and respect for family life.
House of Lords contains some comments that suggest that the sexual preference of the participants was
relevant to their conviction. See R. V. Brown, 2 All E.R. 75 (1993); and, in a different case concerning sadomasochistic activity between husband and wife, charges were dismissed, at least in part because they were
married and the state ought not to interfere in the marital relationship. See R v. Wilson, Q.B. 47 (1996).
8.
Grant v. Southwest Trains, All E.R. (EC) 193 (1998). For a discussion of Grant see Laurence
Heifer, InternationalDecisions: Grant v. Southwest Trains, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 200 (1999).
9.
See Pieter van Dijk, The Treatment of Homosexuals Under the European Convention on
Human Rights in KEES WAALDUK AND ANDREW CLAPHAM (EDS), HOMOSEXUALITY: A EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY ISSUE 179, 189-92 (1993). Van Dijk observes that the interpretation of "family life" in the
heterosexual context has been broad, in contrast to the narrow and exclusionary interpretation in the context
of same-sex relationships. Although the van Dijk piece is now six years old, there have been no subsequent
cases that reverse the exclusion of lesbian and gay families from the notion of "family" under the European
Convention. Indeed, in 1998 in Grant the European Court of Justice expressly reaffirmed that same-sex
relationships do not constitute "family" under European law. See Grant v. Southwest Trains, All E.R. (EC)
193, IN 33-35 (1998).
10.

33290/96, Salguiero Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999).
11.
P v. S and Cornwall County Council, All E.R. (EC) 397 (1996). (discrimination against a
person who underwent sex reassigment surgery constituted discrimination on the basis of sex).
12.
Rees v. United Kingdom, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 56 (1987); Cossey v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 13 at 622 (1991); Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 163 (1999). Cf B v.
France, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1993). The major concern for transsexuals in these cases was the ability to alter
key documents concerning their life, in particular birth certificates (denied in Rees, Cossey and Sheffield) and
identity cards (permitted in B).
13.

X, Y, and Z v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 143 (1997). (a female to male transsexual, his
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The United Nations

In the United Nations human rights system, events concerning international human rights and sexuality have occurred mostly outside the judicial
arena. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played an important role
in achieving visibility for lesbian and gay concerns in the international sphere.
Two gay and lesbian NGOs, the International Lesbian and Gay Association
(ILGA) and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission
(IGLHRC), have, for many years, tried to bring lesbian and gay issues into the
international arena with mixed success. In 1993, ILGA was granted consultative status to the United Nations Economic and Social Council. 4 This allowed
ILGA, along with scores of other NGOs, to participate in United Nations
conferences and some United Nations meetings, though not to participate in
United Nations decision-making. This status was short-lived, however, as the
United States led a campaign to oust ILGA from its consultative status based
on the fact that some national member organizations, including the United
States based North American Man-Boy Love Association (NAMBLA),
advocated inter-generational sex. Although ILGA eventually expelled
NAMBLA and two other national organizations from its ranks, its accreditation
was nonetheless suspended, as one other national member organization was
alleged to support pedophilia.15 As a result of the controversy, the United
Nations AIDS program has indicated that it will not fund any project linked to
ILGA."6 Currently, no gay and lesbian NGO has consultative status at the
United Nations.
Mainstream NGOs have also begun, in the last 10 years, to play an
important role in the area of sexuality and human rights. In 1991, Amnesty
International included people imprisoned for their homosexual sexual activity

partner and their children did constitute a family for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention. However,
Article 8 imposes no obligation on states to recognize as the father of a child a person who is not the
biological father of that child, hence there was no breach of the Convention).

14. ILGA had been seeking consultative status with ECOSOC since 1991, but its application was
extremely controversial, ultimately requiring the NGO Committee of ECOSOC to depart from its traditional
consensus decision-making model and put ILGA's application to a vote. See Wayne Morgan and Kristen
Walker, Rejecting (In)tolerance: Tolerance and Homosex 20 MEIB. U. L. REv. 202, 213-4 (1995).

15.

For a detailed description and analysis of the events surrounding ILGA's removal from

consultative status, see Joshua Gamson, Messages of Exclusion: Gender, Movements and Symbolic

Boundaries, 11 GENDER AND SOCIETY 178, 183-87 (1997).
16. Douglas Sanders, Kurt Krickler and Rodney Croome, The InternationalLesbian and Gay
Association: Finding a Place In International Law, (visited Feb. 18, 1999).

lnformation/finding_a_placejn_international.htm>.

<http://www.ilga.org/
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or identity in its definition of "political prisoner,"'" and since then, several other
mainstream NGOs have begun to address lesbian and gay issues.'
In terms of the United Nations itself, activity has been more recent still.
In 1993, gay and lesbian rights issues were raised by activists at the Vienna
Conference on Human Rights - this was the first time these issues had been
spoken of at a major United Nations conference. In 1995, lesbian rights were
raised by women's NGOs at Beijing and references to sexual orientation were
included in the draft Platform for Action, although they were bracketed.' 9 All
these references were ultimately removed from the final Platform for Action,
however.2'
In the area of judicial or quasi-judicial decisions, there is but one within
the United Nations system. In 1994, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee handed down its views in the Toonen communication concerning
Australia, where one state, Tasmania, criminalized private consensual sex
between men. The Committee held that the Tasmanian law violated the right
to privacy in the ICCPR.2' This was a significant milestone in the battle for gay
and lesbian rights. There have not yet been further cases in the United Nations
human rights system, but there is a pending case of interest, concerning New
Zealand's refusal to allow same-sex couples to marry. 22

17.
Laurence Heifer and Alice Miller, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights: Toward a United
States and TransnationalJurisprudence,9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 61, 90 (1996).

18. For example, the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, the International Human Rights Law
Group, the International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights Watch and the Center for Women's Global
Leadership. See Laurence Heifer and Alice Miller, Sexual Orientationand Human Rights: Toward a United
States and TransnationalJurisprudence,9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 61, n. 138 (1996).
19.

Dianne Otto, Lesbians? Not in My Country, 20 ALTERNATIVE LAW JOURNAL 288, (1995).

"Bracketing" refers to the United Nations practice of placing material not yet agreed upon by states in
brackets in draft documents. Bracketed material is then negotiated by the states.
20.
1d.; See also Dianne Otto, Holding Up Half the Sky, But for Whose Benefit? A Critical
Analysis of the Fourth World Conference on Women, 6 AUSTRALAN FEMpNS L J. 7 (1996).
21.
Comm. No 488/1992, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm'n. 50th Sess, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994). For a discussion of the Toonen case, see Wayne Morgan, Identifying Evil
for What It Is: Tasmania, Sexual Perversity and The United Nations, 19 MELB. U. L REV. 740 (1994);
Kristen Walker, InternationalHumanRights Law andSexuality: StrategiesforDomestic Utigation,3 N.Y.
CrrY L. R., 115 (1998).
22.
Known as Quilter v. New Zealand. Communication to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights against
the Government of New Zealand (filed Nov. 1998). As of November 1999, the petition had yet to be assigned
a communication number by the UNHRC. See Laurence Heifer, Quilter v. New Zealand: Will the U.N.
Human Rights Committee Recognize Same-Sex Marriages? "in Robert Wintemute and Mads Andenas, eds.,
LEGALRECOGNrfON OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW, forthcoming, Hart Publishing, (2000).
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Notably, most of the events described above center on sexual identity
categories, rather than on non-normative sexual activity. This can be problematic, as it redefines existing identity categories and may also reflect culturally
specific understandings of sexuality. It also excludes from human rights
protec-tion those whose sexuality is non-normative or stigmatized, but whom
do not fit into sexual identity categories as traditionally conceived. For a more
detailed illustration, I turn to the example of refugee law.
l. REFUGEE LAW AND SEXUALITY
The Refugee Convention provides that a refugee is a person who,
[o]wing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or
political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country.

It is now accepted by the major refugee receiving countries, including the
United States, Canada, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, and the
Netherlands, that gay men and lesbians may constitute a particular social group
for the purposes of the Refugee Convention and thus are entitled to protection
if they are persecuted because of their sexual identity.23 Canada has also
accepted that transsexuals may constitute a particular social group.24
The cases have generally treated homosexuality as something immutable
or, in some cases, either unchangeable or something the individual should not
be required to change. In all jurisdictions, the emphasis has been on the
identity category "homosexual," rather than on the individual's sexual behavior.
This emphasis on sexual identity is underscored by the fact that "mere"
criminalization of same-sex sexual activity is not generally recognized as
persecution.2 5 Rather, there must be some serious detriment to a person because
of his or her identity or status as gay or lesbian, not just because of his or her
sexual activity.
In this regard it is interesting to note that heterosexuals who violate social
norms concerning sex - by engaging in sex outside marriage or sex for money,

23.
See Eric Ramanathan, Queer Cases: A Comparative Analysis of Global Sexual OrientationBased Asylum Jurisprudence, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1996).
24.
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board Case No T94-07129 (14 August 1995), 5 (copy on
file with the author).
25.
See, e.g., F v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 947 F.L.R. (1999) 14.
(visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.austlii.edu.au>. See also Kristen Walker, The Importance ofBeing Out:
Sexuality and Refugee Status, 18 SYDNEY L. REv. 568, 581-85 (1996).
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for example - have, to date, received less protection under refugee law than gay
and lesbian claimants. In Australia there have, to date, been no cases where
those engaging in sex work, adultery, or fornication have been accepted as
constituting a "particular social group" for the purposes of the Refugee
Convention, although both adultery and fornication have been the basis for
several claims for refugee status.
A.

Adultery

A woman who committed adultery in Iran successfully obtained refugee
status in Australia. The basis was persecution on the basis of membership in
the social group of "women in Iran who have refused to submit to the severity
of the Islamic code as it is enforced by the (Iranian) government. ' 26 In contrast,
a man who engaged in adultery was unsuccessful in claiming refugee status in
Australia. He argued that the Iranian law against adultery constituted
persecution on the basis of religious belief. The Australian Federal Court did
not accept that the application of a generally applicable criminal law concerning
adultery constituted persecution on the basis of religious belief, unless the
application of the law was itself discriminatory.2 7
B.

Fornication

Fornication, that is, consensual sex between unmarried adults, has been the
basis for several claims for refugee status in Australia. However, these claims
have not been based on the argument that "fornicators" constitute a particular
social group and they have been unsuccessful. In one case, the claimant feared
he would be killed by the family of the woman with whom he had sexual
relations. The Australian Refugee Review Tribunal did not accept that this
constituted persecution for a Convention reason.2" In Z v. Ministerfor Immigration and MulticulturalAffairs,29 also concerning Iran, Z had engaged in
fornication and was threatened with prosecution and punishment of stoning, or
perhaps whipping, if he failed to marry the woman concerned. Here the social
group, as argued by the applicant, varied from "single Iranians... required, on

26.
Australian Refugee Review Tribunal Decision N95 09580,17, 22,23 (1996). (visited Feb. 19,
2000) <http://www.austlii.edu.au>. In the United Kingdom, women accused of adultery succeeded in their
claim for asylum, on the basis that the claimants were members of the social group of women. See generally,
R v. ImmigrationAppeals Tribunal; exparte Shah 2 All E.R. 545 (1999).
27.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Darboy 931 F.L.R. (1998). (visited Feb.
19, 2000) <http://www.austlii.edu.au>.
28.
Australian Refugee Review Tribunal Decision V97/06522 (1998) (visited Feb. 19, 2000)
<http://www.austlii.edu.au>.
29.

1578 F.L.R. (1998). (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.austlii.edu.au>.
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penalty, to marry in consequence of relationship with a member of the opposite
sex" to "single adult male Iranians, inherently possessed of sexual drive." The
Federal Court did not decide on the social group question, however, as it found
that the applicant's fear was of the application of a law of general application,
which did not constitute persecution for a Convention reason.30
C.

Sex Work

There have been no Australian cases of which I am aware in which a
claimant argued that "sex workers" constitute a particular social group or where
a person has claimed a fear of persecution based on his or her profession as a
sex worker. However, fear of "forced prostitution" has been argued as
constituting a well-founded fear of persecution. 31 This was rejected by the
Tribunal in each case on the basis that the persecution alleged was not for a
Convention reason.
The failure to consider adulterers, sex workers, and fornicators to be
particular social groups seems to be, at least in part, because adultery,
fornication, and prostitution are seen as behaviors, not identities. Adultery,
fornication, and sex work are not seen as constituting particular kinds of people
in the way that same-sex sexual activity, for example, is seen as constituting a
particular kind of person, namely the "homosexual." The sex of one's sexual
partner is seen as something fundamental to one's identity, something
immutable, difficult to change, or that one should not be required to change.
"Homosexual" is something a person "is." In contrast, adultery, fornication,
and prostitution are viewed simply as "things a person does," and thus, are not
seen as attracting the operation of the Convention in the same way. 32 Although
protection has been given in some cases concerning adultery, this has been
based more on gender than on sexual behavior.
Thus, where sexuality is concerned, refugee law has protected those who
fit themselves within an identity category such as gay or lesbian. But it has not,
to date, protected those whose sexual behavior violates social norms and who
do not fit within a recognizable, essentialized identity category.

30.
Z v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 1578)F.L.R. (1998) (visited Feb. 19.
2000) <http://www.austlii.edu.au>.
31.
See, e.g., Australian Refugee Review Tribunal Decisions V97/06838 (1998) and N98/25996
(1999). (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.austlii.edu.au>.
32.
This distinction between "things one does" and "things one is" has been drawn in a number of
cases. See Morato v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 111 A.LR. 417, 420, 422 (1992); Ram
v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 130 A.LR. 314, 319 (1997); Australian Refugee
Review Tribunal Decision, V97/06522 (1998) (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.austii.edu.au>.
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IV. WHERE TO FROM HERE?

To date, most human rights activism and jurisprudence in the area of
sexuality has been concentrated in several disparate locations. First, there is
gay/lesbian/bisexual/transsexual rights activism, which has centered primarily
on the right to privacy in the criminal law context; the right to equality, often
in the area of relationship recognition; and the right of transsexuals to
recognition of their new sex. Second, there is extensive work around women's
sexuality by feminist scholars and activists. Here, the focus has been broader
and has included reproductive rights, rape, sexual trafficking, sexual health, and
female genital mutilation - with some attention to women's right to sexual
autonomy and lesbian sexuality. Third, there has been some activism by sex
workers at an international level. But this has not yet received a great deal of
mainstream human rights attention, in part because sex worker rights are
controversial within the feminist movement, a large segment of which seeks to
end prostitution rather than champion sex workers' rights.
Although there have been some coalitions between these various groups,
there has not, to date, been any sustained action around sexuality more broadly
conceived. Nor has there been, until recently, any attempt to articulate a rights
framework specific to sexuality. Rather, rights work in the area of sexuality has
generally focused on fitting sexuality issues within the existing human rights
framework, particularly the rights of equality and privacy. While this work has
produced some significant advances, it nonetheless has some limitations, as it
often fails to challenge dominant conceptions of sexuality.
As an alternative approach, I suggest that we articulate a right to sexual
self-determination," rather than either privacy or non-discrimination on the
basis of sexual identity. Thus, rather than pursuing an international declaration
or convention on sexual rights that simply adds sexual orientation as a category
of non-discrimination to existing civil and political rights,' we need to imagine
and enumerate new rights claims around the area of sexuality. This does not
mean that we cannot or should not use the language of identity categories visibility of particular non-normative sexual activities and preferences is clearly

33.
The phrase "sexual self-determination" is potentially controversial. I have discussed this choice
of words elsewhere. See Kristen Walker, Capitalism, Gay Identity and International Human Rights Law,
forthcoming, 10 AUSTRALASIAN GAY AND LESBIAN L. J., 2000. 1 note that others have used the idea of a
"right to sexuality." See Alice Miller, Human Rights and Sexuality: First Steps Towards Articulating a
Rights Framework for Claims to Sexual Rights and Freedoms, forthcoming, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1999
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw ANNUAL MEETING, (2000).

34. This is suggested by Eric Heinze. See ERIC HEINZE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION: A HUMAN RIGHT
289 (1995). For a more detailed discussion of Heinze's approach and the limitations with it, see Walker,
supra note 33.
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important and can challenge the present heterosexism of human rights law.35
However, we must be careful to acknowledge the cultural specificity of such
categories and their narrow focus. Sexual self-determination is not just about
freedom and equality for lesbians and gay men, rather, it is about valuing sexual
diversity.
My notion of sexual self-determination is thicker than a simple assertion
of a right to liberty, although liberty is clearly an aspect of self-determination.
Rather than merely seeking an absence of state regulation of behavior, sexual
self-determination also seeks to achieve the conditions under which individuals
can make choices about their sexuality - albeit choices constrained by local
social and cultural traditions and knowledge. This involves not only the
absence of criminal law regulating consensual sexual activity, but the fostering
of social structures that recognize individual and joint choices about important
relationships and permit the expression of sexuality by individuals, couples, and
groups. This requires the creation of a society in which diversity of sexual
expression is recognized as good and fostered; in which there is education on
diverse sexualities; and in which we are not constrained in our sexual activities
by poverty and sickness. It is, in short, a transformative social project not
limited to simply claiming existing rights. I argue that any international
instrument dealing with sexuality ought to proceed from the premise of sexual
self-determination. It ought to enumerate a right to engage in consensual sex,
including public sex, paid sex work, and a right to freedom of sexual speech
and expression. It should provide for freedom from coercive sex, including
sexual trafficking and freedom from violence because of sexual difference. It
should provide for recognition of important sexual relationships36 and should
recognize reproductive rights, including abortion. It should recognize rights for
those with HIV or AIDS and should provide rights for those who violate
traditional gender norms, including but not confined to transgender folk. It
should also provide for sex education and sexual self-determination for young
people.

35.
As Dianne Otto has observed, "recognizing the risks of identity politics does not have to lead
to its rejection. This recognition could also lead towards understanding and practicing identity in a different
way - as always contested, as contingent and dynamic, rather than definitive and static." See Dianne Otto,
Sexualities and Solidarities: Some Thoughts on CoalitionalStrategiesin the Context of InternationalLaw,
8 AUSTRALASIAN GAY AND LESBIAN L. J. 27, 33 (1999).

36.
I have argued elsewhere for a model of relationship recognition that, while recognizing
important sexual relationships, reserves state financial support to relationships involving caring for children
or other dependents. See Kristen Walker, U.N. Human Rights Law and Same-Sex Relationships: Where to
From Here? in ROBERT WINTEMUTE AND MADS ANDENAS, eds., LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OFNATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,forthcoming, Hart Publishing,
(2000).
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Any articulation of sexual rights needs also to acknowledge the links
between economic and social rights and sexuality." For example, we need to
recognize the links between poverty and sexual oppression, particularly for
women. Similarly, rights to sexual health are essential, especially in the context
of HIV and AIDS.
This list is not, and is not intended to be, comprehensive. It is, rather, a
starting point for debate on these issues. It is important, I argue, for those of us
working on sexuality issues from diverse perspectives to try to articulate the
commonalties between us and also to assess our differences. Perhaps it will not
be possible to develop a consistent formulation of a right to sexuality. Perhaps
such a project is simply to broad or too abstract; or perhaps sexuality is too
culturally specific to allow for a universal right to sexual self-determination.
But, even if this is so, a dialogue on these issues can only advance our
understanding of sexuality and the ways in which international human rights
can protect sexual expression.

See, e.g., Dianne Otto, Questions of Solidarity and Difference: Towards Transforming the
37.
Terms of Lesbian Interventions in International Law, forthcoming, in ViCrORIA BROWNWORTH AND
RUTHANN ROBSON (EDS), SEDUCTIONS OF JUSTICE: LESBIAN LEGALTHEORIES AND PRACTICES.

on file with the author).

(Manuscript

